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PERKHIDMATAN SELAIN DARI AUDIT, TADBIR URUS KORPORAT 
DAN KEBEBASAN JURU AUDIT DI MALAYSIA 
  ABSTRAK 
 
Kajian ini meneroka isu yang telah dibincangkan lebih dari 50 tahun dan 
menawarkan pandangan kritikal terhadap undang-undang yang sedia ada ke atas 
profesyen pengauditan di Malaysia. Isu kebebasan juru audit berkenaan dengan 
perkhidmatan selain audit menjadi perhatian bukan hanya kepada ahli akademik, ahli 
pengkaji, penggubal undang-undang di negara Amerika Syarikat, United Kingdom 
malah di seluruh dunia termasuk Malaysia. Kes Enron di Amerika Syarikat dan 
seluruh syarikat yang telah jatuh termasuk Transmile dan Megan Media di Malaysia 
telah membangkitkan persoalan mengenai kewibawaan juru audit dan tadbir urus 
korporat. Kebanyakkan bukti pengkisahan mendakwa peruntukan kepada 
perkhidmatan selain audit akan menggugat kebebasan juru audit dan menurun kualiti 
perolehan. Kajian yang lepas telah menghasilkan bukti yang bercampur iaitu 
perkhidmatan selain audit menggugat kebebasan juru audit dan perkhidmatan selain 
audit juga menghaslikan kerja audit yang efisien. Ahli pengkaji menjangkakan kesan 
ke atas kebebasan juru audit dapat dilihat dengan jelas sekiranya perkhidmatan selain 
audit dipecahkan mengikut jenis dan perkhidmatan selain audit yang berulang dan 
tidak berulang.  Oleh itu kajian ini mengkaji hubungan diantara perkhidmatan selain 
audit, jenis perkhidmatan selain audit, perkhidmatan selain audit yang berulang dan 
tidak berulang, jenis perkhidmatan selain audit yang berulang dan tidak berulang 
dengan kebebasan juru audit.  Kajian ini juga melihat susun tadbir urus korporat ke 
atas kebebasan juru audit. Interaksi tadbir urus korporat ke atas hubungan antara 
xviii 
 
perkhidmatan selain audit dengan kebebasan juru audit juga dikaji. Kajian ini 
menggunakan kualiti terakru daripada modifikasi model Dechow dan Dichev (2002), 
iaitu salah satu kualiti perolehan yang digunakan untuk mewakili kebebasan juru 
audit. Bermula Jun 2001, ‘Bursa Malaysia Listing Requirement’ mengeluarkan 
arahan kepada semua syarikat yang berdaftar di Bursa Malaysia untuk mendedahkan 
maklumat mengenai perkhidmatan selain audit di dalam laporan tahunan. Oleh itu 
dengan maklumat yang tersedia, kajian ini dapat dijalankan untuk jangkamasa 3 
tahun (2009-2011), dengan jumlah pemerhatian sebanyak 1118.  Hasil kajian 
menunjukkan bahawa perkhidmatan selain audit secara keseluruhan memberi kesan 
negatif kepada kebebasan audit, yang mana berlawanan dengan jangkaan. Hasil 
kajian ini menunjukan hubungan yang terjalin  diantara juru audit dan perniagaan 
yang diaudit menggugat kebebasan juru audit. Manakala jenis perkhidmatan selain 
audit memberi kesan yang berbeza kepada kebebasan juru audit. Hasilan yang diluar 
jangkaan tetapi menarik, perkhidmatan selain audit secara berulang merupakan 
ancaman kepada kebebasan juru audit. Hubungan negatif di antara perkhidmatan 
selain audit dan perkhidmatan selain audit yang berulang dengan kebebasan juru 
audit dapat dikurangkan dengan kehadiran tadbir urus korporat yang baik. Hasilan 
kajian dapat menyumbang kepada penggubalan polisi dengan mengambil kira kesan 
jenis perkhidmatan selain audit, perkhidmatan selain audit yang berulang dan tidak 
berulang kepada kebebasan juru audit. Hasilan dari kajian juga menyumbang kepada 
teori berkenaan dengan kualiti terakru dan tadbir urus korporat di Malaysia.  
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NONAUDIT SERVICES, CORPORATE GOVERNANCE AND AUDITOR 
INDPENDENCE IN MALAYSIA 
ABSTRACT 
 
This study explores the unsolved issues that have been debated for more than 50 
years and provides critical insights into the current regulatory issues confronting the 
auditing profession in Malaysia. The issue of auditor independence on nonaudit 
services has become a concern to the academicians, researchers, and regulators, 
especially Securities and Exchange Commissions (SECs) not only in the US, UK, 
Australia, but also worldwide, including Malaysia. The Enron case in the US and the 
other collapsed companies throughout the world, including Tramsmile and Megan 
Media in Malaysia, has raised question on the credibility of external auditor and the 
governance aspect. Most of the anecdotal evidence claim that the provision of 
nonaudit services might impair auditor independence and reduce the earnings quality. 
Previous studies have provided mixed evidence that nonaudit services affect 
auditor’s independence (due to economic bonding) and nonaudit services yields 
knowledge spillover and improve auditor efficiency. Past researchers have suggested 
that nonaudit services should be categorised into types and recurring and 
nonrecurring to get clear picture on the impairment in auditor’s independence. 
Therefore, this study examines the association of nonaudit services, types of nonaudit 
services, recurring and nonrecurring nonaudit services, and types of recurring and 
nonrecurring nonaudit services with auditor independence. The study also examines 
the relationship between corporate governance variables and auditor independence. 
The study tests the interaction effect of corporate governance variable between 
nonaudit services and auditor independence. This study adopts the accruals quality 
(Modified Dechow and Dichev (2002) Model) as a proxy for auditor independence. 
Beginning in June 2001, the Bursa Malaysia Listing Requirements came out with the 
requirement for all companies listed in Bursa Malaysia to disclose information on 
nonaudit services. Therefore, with the availability of the data, this research covers 
duration of three years (2009-2011), with 1118 observations. The study found that 
nonaudit services in total affect auditor independence, which is in contradiction to 
the hypothesized statement. This empirical result indicates the economic bonding 
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created between auditor and client restricted the auditors from objectively 
performing their duty. In addition, different types of nonaudit services pose different 
threat to auditor independence. In an unexpected but interesting result, recurring 
nonaudit services indicate a threat to auditor independence. The negative relationship 
between nonaudit services and recurring nonaudit services and accruals quality 
weakens with the presence of good governance. These results contribute to policy 
deliberation in Malaysia to account for the effects of types of nonaudit services, 
recurring, and nonrecurring nonaudit services on auditor independence. This study 
also contributes to the theoretical perspectives on accruals quality and corporate 
governance in Malaysia. 
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CHAPTER 1: INTRODUCTION 
 
 
1.1 Background of the Study 
 
 
Issues concerning auditor independence have been discussed and debated by the 
legislatures and regulators worldwide (American Institute of Certified Public 
Accountant 1978; Levitt 2000; Public Accounting Oversight Board (PCAOB) 2005, 
MIA by-Laws; Malaysian Code on Corporate Governance (MCCG), Bursa Malaysia 
Listing Requirements). Researchers have investigated the issue and identified several 
potential threats to auditor independence. However, the issue remains largely 
unsolved. 
 
Auditor independence has been examined from different angles by different scholars. 
Antle (1984) stated that the term auditor independence has no definite meaning. 
Many observers have agreed that auditor independence refers to the conditional 
probability of reporting a discovered breach (DeAngelo, 1981b), the ability to resist 
client pressure (Knapp, 1985), a mental state of objectivity and lack of bias (SEC 
2000). In addition, the IFAC code, SEC 2000 and MIA by-Laws have defined 
independence in terms of two aspects: independence of mind and independence in 
appearance. Independence of mind refers to a state of mind which permits the 
rendering of a conclusion without being affected by influences that compromise 
professional judgments. This state of mind allows an individual to act with integrity, 
while exercising objectivity or professional scepticism. This type of independence is 
unobservable. In contrast, independence in appearance refers to the avoidance of 
2 
 
facts and circumstances that are so significant that a reasonable and informed third 
party would reasonably conclude that integrity, objectivity, or professional 
scepticism has been compromised. The independence issue remains even if an 
auditor is said to be independence in fact but is perceived to have a lack of 
independence in appearance.  
 
Prior studies have empirically explored the relationship between potential threats to 
auditor independence such as financial, business, and employment relationships 
(Firth, 1980; Geiger & North, 2006; Geiger et al., 2005; Imhoff, 1978; Martinov et 
al., 2011); the effect of fees from audit clients involving the issue of lowballing 
(Ahmad et al., 2006; Chung & Kallapur, 2003; Schatzberg & Sevcik, 1994; 
Shockley, 1981; Simon & Francis, 1988) and issue of audit rotation (Dopuch et al., 
2001; Geiger & Raghunandan, 2002; Johnson et al., 2002; Myers et al., 2003). 
Overall findings from these studies have been mixed. 
 
Another conflicting issue on auditor independence is the provision of nonaudit 
services which has received attention from regulators, practitioners, researchers, and 
academicians. An important concern for regulators is the economic bonding created 
between auditor and client, including a tendency for an auditor to acquiesce to client 
preferences. 
 
Threats to auditor independence arise from the close relationship between auditor 
and client, which create a bonding between them. This close bonding, as explained in 
DeAngelo’s (1981b) model of audit pricing, describes incumbent auditors as 
possessing comparative cost advantages associated with audit start-up and switching 
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costs. Such cost advantages help incumbent auditors earn quasi rents in the future. 
Simunic (1984) revealed that the provision of nonaudit services also yield knowledge 
spillover that generates audit cost saving and improve auditor’s independence. In 
addition, Palmrose (1986) concluded that both incumbent and non-incumbent 
auditors affect auditor independence. The study takes into consideration nonaudit 
services as homogenous in their ability to generate ‘knowledge spillover’. However, 
Simunic (1984) highlighted that additional insights might be gained by partitioning 
nonaudit services into types.  
 
Francis (2006) reviewed the nonaudit services research literature over the past 40 
years and concluded that there was no ‘smoking gun’ evidence linking the provision 
of nonaudit services with audit failures. A crucial question is whether the relationship 
between nonaudit services and auditor independence is affected by recurring or 
nonrecurring auditor-provided nonaudit services. 
 
In the US, the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) began in 2003 to require 
that the information of nonaudit services fees be partitioned into different types: 
audit fees, audit related nonaudit services, tax related nonaudit services, and other 
fees (latest). This requirement takes into consideration the requirement of restricting 
financial information system (FISDI) as issued by Sarbanes Oxley Act 2002 (SOX 
2002). In Malaysia, the requirement to disclose information concerning nonaudit 
services became effective on 1 June 2001. 
 
Agency theory explains the conduct of managers and owner of the business as a 
consequence of split-up of ownership and domination. Such an increase in 
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information asymmetry has created agency conflict, leading to situations in which a 
manager will be incentivized to manage earnings. Previous research has shown that 
corporate governance is able to mitigate the agency problem apart from the existence 
of external auditors. 
 
Responsibility for setting objectives and monitoring and controlling the firm’s 
activities rests with the board of directors, which is central to decision-making within 
the firm (Fama & Jensen, 1983). It is generally considered imperative that an audit 
committee be confined to non-executive directors if it is to carry out its duties 
effectively. The independence of the audit committee members is important as the 
monitoring they provide affects earnings quality, audit quality (Abbott & Park, 
2000), and auditor independence (Abbott et al., 2003b). Independent audit 
committees have been associated with higher disclosure quality (Karamanou & 
Vafeas, 2005) and a lower cost of debt finance (Anderson et al., 2004). Bronson et 
al. (2009) found that the benefits of audit committees are limited unless the 
committee comprises of independent directors only. 
 
The study is motivated by several major considerations. First, the subject of nonaudit 
services and how it affects auditor independence is a topic of concern to both policy 
makers and regulators. Previous studies raised concern regarding the appropriateness 
of policies in restricting certain types of nonaudit services. For example, as a result 
of the Enron case, US regulatory bodies promulgated the Sarbanes Oxley Act 2002, 
prohibiting nine types of nonaudit services such as bookkeeping, financial system 
design and implementation, appraisal or valuation services, actuarial services, 
internal auditing, auditor acting as a director, officer or employee of the audit client, 
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experts opinion, dealer or investment advisor or investment banker services and any 
other service that the PCAOB deems impermissible. On the other hand, for non-
prohibited nonaudit services, such regulation gives the power of discretion to the 
audit committee to preapprove in order to upsurge the sustainability of the audit 
profession.  
 
In Malaysia, the requirement of nonaudit services is stated in the MIA by-Laws, 
Bursa Malaysia Listing Requirements and the latest is stated in the Revised 
Corporate Governance 2012. As compared to the US regulation, Malaysia does not 
prohibit any nonaudit services to be served by the external auditor, which means that 
this requirement is still lacking. This study has been motivated by a desire to help 
policy makers in policy deliberation as a way of harmonizing the merit of nonaudit 
services towards audit pricing in Malaysia.  
 
The motivation of this study is to distinguish recurring and nonrecurring non audit 
services resulting from the conclusion highlighted by Schneider et al. (2006) in his 
review of nonaudit services issues and a study conducted by Paterson and Valencia 
(2011). Per findings of Paterson and Valencia (2011), even though recurring and 
nonrecurring audit-related nonaudit services are both positively associated with 
restatement, effects are significantly larger among nonrecurring audit related non- 
audit services. Similar to tax results these audit related nonaudit services findings 
support the idea that distinguishing recurring and nonrecurring non audit services is 
important. 
 
6 
 
Furthermore, the study is also motivated by the limitations highlighted by Chung and 
Kallapur (2003): 
 
“For example, it is possible that not all nonaudit services have the 
effect of compromising independence. ASR No. 264 mentions tax 
advice as an example of a service that has obvious economies of 
scope with the audit function (for auditing the deferred tax 
accruals). If there are economies of scope and some of the 
resulting cost savings are passed on to the client, then a client 
would have to pay more to purchase such services from a party 
other than the auditor; a threat to stop purchasing such services is 
therefore less credible than a threat to stop purchasing other 
kinds of services. Also, an expectation of recurring purchase of a 
service creates more incentives for the auditor than does a one-
time purchase. However, the proxy disclosures do not separate the 
different kinds of services so we are unable to control for the 
possibility that the inclusion of fees for such services in the ratios 
weakens the power of our tests”. 
(2003, pg. 938) 
This study considers conflicting empirical evidence from previous studies. Prior 
researchers focused on homogenous nonaudit services (Abbott et al., 2003b; 
Ashbaugh et al., 2003; Craswell, 1999; Frankel et al., 2002; Kinney et al., 2004; 
Simunic, 1984) and types of nonaudit services (Abbott et al., 2007; Huang et al., 
2007; Paterson & Valencia, 2011) on auditor independence and the results are still 
inconclusive and remain elusive. Specifically, for types of nonaudit services, the 
study conducted by Paterson and Valencia (2011) found that tax and audit related 
service pose less threat to auditor independence. Huang et al. (2007) also fail to find 
evidence in support of claims that client with higher level of tax fee ratio and other 
nonaudit fees ratio are more likely to have a bias financial reporting. On the other 
hand, the study conducted by Abbott et al. (2007) provides evidence of independence 
problem for recurring services rather than nonrecurring. 
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Voluminous studies have been conducted in different institutional setting to see the 
association of nonaudit services and auditor independence, such as in the US, 
(Francis et al., 1979, Frankel et al., 2002; Abbott et al., 2003a; Ashbaugh et al., 
2003; Brandon et al., 2004; Chung & Kallapur 2003; Larcker & Richardson 2004; 
Krishnan et al., 2005; Huang et al., 2007; Dhaliwal et al., 2008; the UK (Lennox 
1999, Firth 2002), New Zealand (Hay et al., 2006); Zhang & Emanuel 2008) 
Australia (Sharma & Sidhu 2001, Ruddock et al., 2006 ; Gul et al., 2006) and 
Malaysia (Kamaruddin et al., 2012a; Shafie et al., 2007; Che Ahmad et al., 2006). 
The latest study was conducted by Paterson and Valencia (2011) and Abdul Wahab 
et al. (2014) focusing on the recurring and nonrecurring nonaudit services in the US 
and Malaysia respectively. However very little research has looked into the 
association between recurring and nonrecurring nonaudit services in type and 
accruals quality in emerging capital. 
 
The study builds on and extends the studies of Abdul Wahab et al. (2014), Paterson 
and Valencia (2011), Frankel et al. (2002), and Kinney and Libby (2002). These 
studies use earnings quality as proxies for auditor independence, to test whether 
auditor independence would compromise with the provision of nonaudit services. 
Kinney and Libby (2002) examined five different types of nonaudit services and 
found that different types of nonaudit services give different impact to auditor 
independence. In addition, Paterson and Valencia (2011) extend it by modelling 
restatement using recurring and nonrecurring for three types of nonaudit services and 
found that recurring tax services are the only nonaudit services provided by the 
auditor which is negatively associated with restatement. The study treats nonaudit 
services as homogenous, while Frankel et al. (2002) used discretionary accruals 
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(DACC) as a measurement for earnings quality, which reveals that an auditor may 
compromise their independence while they serve that service. 
 
The study extends the current researches in a number of ways. First, this study use 
Malaysia data, where the institutional setting may not be the same as compared to 
developed countries such as the US, UK, and also Australia. Although Paterson and 
Valencia (2011) examined the different types of nonaudit services by focusing on 
recurring and nonrecurring non audit services to auditor independence, that kind of 
study employs the financial restatement to proxy for auditor independence without 
the interaction of corporate governance variables, board of director in terms of 
bumiputera and non-bumiputera, and audit committee characteristics. Furthermore 
instead of restatement this study employs earnings quality focusing on accruals 
quality to proxy for auditor independence and this will add to the literature on 
accruals quality and nonaudit services which are regarded as limited in Malaysia. 
Paterson and Valencia’s study was conducted in the US setting with established rules 
and regulation on auditor. The study believed that the different institutional setting in 
Malaysia might contribute to the different view with reference to the auditor 
independence issue.  
 
The study models the accruals quality that applies earnings quality as a function of 
recurring and nonrecurring for different types of nonaudit services. Quality financial 
reporting aligns with auditor independence, and therefore it is an ideal way to 
represent accruals quality to auditor impairment. The lower accruals quality would 
represent the lower earnings quality and the increase impairment in auditor 
independence.  
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Thirdly, the study will use the latest data, spanning from 2009 to 2011. The chosen 
years of observation will help to see nonaudit services pattern as compared to the 
previous year which have been explored by previous researchers. The current year of 
observation helps to shed light on the issue of auditor independence in relation to 
recurring and nonrecurring types of nonaudit services.  
 
The study also examines the effect of corporate governance on auditor independence 
and the interaction of corporate governance with nonaudit services and auditor 
independence. The study focused on board quality; board of director independence, 
board of director duality, and the audit committee characteristic (internal corporate 
governance mechanisms) as it has the specific charge of overseeing financial 
reporting (Krishnan et al., 2011). Corporate governance attributes help investors by 
aligning the interests of managers with the interests of shareholders and by 
increasing the reliability of financial information and the integrity of the financial 
reporting process (Watts & Zimmerman, 1986). 
 
1.2 Problem Statements 
 
Malaysia offers a different institutional setting which is branded as highly 
concentrated ownership, the prevalence of family controlled business, close ties 
between controlling families and top executives, government intervention, and also 
political influence (Abdul Wahab et al., 2007). This type of business nature in 
Malaysia has increased information asymmetry as well as having a negative effect on 
earnings quality (Claessens et al., 2000; Fan & Wong, 2002). Therefore, Jensen and 
Meckling (1976) highlighted the need to have an independent auditor to solve that 
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kind of problem in aligning the interest of manager and owner of the business. Thus 
auditor independence is fundamental in maintaining quality audit and to restore 
public confidence in the quality of financial reporting and an efficient capital market. 
 
The independence of an auditor is aligned with the quality of accounting information. 
The quality of accounting information worsened after the 1997 Asian Financial 
Crisis and the issue of many collapsed companies associated with accounting scandal 
such as the well-known case of Enron and World Com in the US, HIH insurance in 
Australia, Parmalat in Italy, and also Malaysian companies such as Megan Media, 
Transmile Group Berhad, Technology Resources Industries Berhad, Nasiocom 
Holding Berhad, GP Ocean, Ocean Capital Berhad, Welli Multi Corporation Berhad 
and Southern Bank Berhad. Out of all the cases mentioned, it was claimed that such 
incidences were due to the governance failure and also auditing issues. It was stated 
that in the US, there have been a major changes from the scandal mentioned such as 
the change in audit industry where the big 4 audit firms have either divested or 
publicly announced plans to diminish their consulting businesses, the demise of 
Arthur Anderson in July 2002, the issuance of Sarbanes-Oxley Bill (also known as 
the Corporate Oversight Bill) into law and in November 2003,the New York Stock 
Exchange (NYSE) and NASDAQ adopted an additional set of corporate governance 
rules that apply to most companies with stock listed on these markets. The American 
Stock Exchange (AMEX) joined in with similar rules in December 2003. 
 
Due the above mentioned financial turbulence that creates corporate and audit 
failure, Lee and Md. Ali (2008) stated that it is no surprise that the public is sceptical 
about the integrity of the audit function. The scandals mentioned brought to the 
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question on the quality of auditing (issue of auditor independence), auditors 
reputation, accountability, transparency, and governance process particularly in 
Malaysia.1 According to Lee et al. (2008), the practice of joint provision of audit and 
nonaudit services adds to the factors that might affect the quality of auditing and 
auditor independence. 
 
According to Lee et al. 2008, the joint provision of nonaudit services has been a 
major concern for the auditing profession in Malaysia, as it has a serious implication 
to the accounting profession. The issue of joint provision of nonaudit services has 
been empirically tested in the US, UK, Australia, and the whole world, including 
Malaysia, using various setting and various proxies for auditor independence. 
However, the results remain inconclusive.  
 
Even though it involves worldwide conditions, many significant reforms have been 
done and stringent regulations have been put in place in order to protect the economy 
from financial turbulence. The recent outbreak of a world-wide crisis in financial 
institutions suggests that steps taken to safeguard the trustworthiness of formal and 
statutory financial reporting and auditing may not be effective. For example, some 
auditors have argued that even though the Malaysian Institute of Accountant (MIA) 
has provided guidelines for audit pricing in Malaysia, such guidelines have not been 
                                                          
1 For example, following the Enron case, which was audited by Arthur Anderson, one research conducted by 
Chaney and Philipich (2002) to investigate the impact of the Enron audit failure on auditor reputation. The results 
designate that on the three days after Andersen's admission that a substantial number of documents had been 
destroyed, show that Andersen's other clients experienced a statistically adverse market reaction, suggesting that 
investors downgraded the quality of the audits performed by Andersen. The study reveals that audits performed 
by Andersen's Houston office suffered a more severe decline in abnormal returns on this date After Enron's 
October 16, 2002, third-quarter earnings announcement; Andersen's independence from Enron began to be 
questioned because the audit firm had provided significant nonaudit services to Enron in addition to its fees 
associated with the Enron audit. Andersen received $47.5 million in fees from Enron. Of this amount, $34.2 
million, or 72%, was audit related and tax work. Total fees for other services totalled $13.3 million. Also, Enron 
had outsourced some internal audit functions to Andersen. Andersen’s Houston office came under fire. 
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adopted by most of the CPA firms due to the lack of proper enforcement by its 
regulatory authority (Lee & Md Ali, 2008). However, in the US the issuance of 
Sarbanes Oxley Act 2002 (SOX) is a response to the Enron and World Com cases 
and provides frameworks for the reform of the corporate governance system based 
on integrity, accountability, and for the accounting profession based on the 
independence and fiduciary duty to the public interest. SOX 2002 emphasizes the 
role of audit committee in enhancing the credibility of public company’s reported 
earnings.  
 
Therefore, an empirical study has to be carried out to confirm such contentions in 
other countries. Since the effect of the joint provision of nonaudit services case 
remain unsolved, this study investigates such effect using local setting, namely 
among Malaysian companies listed in the main market of Bursa Malaysia. 
1.3 Research Questions 
 
 
The issue in this research is auditor independence. Auditor independence is aligning 
with earnings quality. This study applies the accruals quality using the modification 
model by Francis et al. (2005) from Dechow and Dichev model (2002) by taking the 
absolute value of estimation error (ABS) as a proxy for auditor independence. To 
align with research objectives, the study addresses the following research questions 
in relation to accruals quality: 
1. What is the relationship between nonaudit services with accruals quality? 
2. What is the relationship between types of nonaudit services and accruals 
quality? 
3. Do recurring or nonrecurring nonaudit services fees affect accruals quality? 
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4.  Do recurring or nonrecurring for different types of nonaudit services affect 
accruals quality? 
5. What is the relationship between board quality and audit committee 
characteristics and accruals quality? 
6. What is the relationship between nonaudit services and accruals quality with 
the presence of good corporate governance? 
 
1.4 Research Objectives 
 
 
The objective of this study is to explore the issue of auditor independence. Since 
there is no consensus on the issue of nonaudit services on auditor independence, an 
empirical study is required, especially to determine at the impact of different types of 
nonaudit services, recurring and nonrecurring non audit services towards auditor 
independence. This study believes that Malaysia provides an interesting context to 
study the merits and costs of the supply of nonaudit services with the availability of 
the data since 1 June, 2001. In order to draw inferences for auditor independence, 
this study apply earnings quality, focusing on accruals quality construct by 
modification model of Francis et al. (2005) from original model Dechow and Dichev 
(2002). 
The study seeks to explore the following research objectives2: 
1. To examine the effect of nonaudit services fees on accruals quality. 
2. To examine the effect between types of nonaudit services fees on accruals 
quality. 
                                                          
2 All research objectives are based on accruals quality. In the literature review, auditor independence is used to 
represent the accruals quality. 
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3. To examine whether recurring or nonrecurring nonaudit service fee that affect 
accruals quality. 
4. To examine whether recurring or nonrecurring types of nonaudit services fees 
affect accruals quality. 
5. To examine the relationship between board quality and audit committee 
characteristics on accruals quality in Malaysia. 
6. To examine the relationship between nonaudit services and accruals quality 
with the presence of board qualities and audit committee characteristics. 
 
1.5 Contributions of the Study 
 
The significance of the study can be seen from both theoretical and practical 
perspectives. From the theoretical practice, the study adds to the growing body of 
empirical evidence that questions whether there is any logical rationale for restricting 
the scope of the services that auditors provide to their audit clients. Result from the 
study help policy makers in Malaysia such as Bursa Malaysia Listing Requirements, 
MIA by-Laws, and Securities Commission for deliberation purposes. In Malaysia, 
particularly to date, not much research has been carried out for recurring and 
nonrecurring type of nonaudit services fees on earnings quality. This kind of 
information is very much informative for the new reform as to ban certain types of 
nonaudit services in homogenous nature without taking into consideration recurring 
and nonrecurring for different types of nonaudit services will leave bad impact to 
auditing profession in balancing the cost and benefit. 
 
The study contributes directly to the audit committee in Malaysia, since as stated in 
Bursa Malaysia Listing Requirements an audit committee should review and screen 
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the appropriateness and independence of external auditors by instituting policies 
governing the circumstances under which contracts for the provision of nonaudit 
services can be entered into and procedures that must be followed by the external 
auditors. In relation to the outcome of the research, an audit committee must be alert 
that nonaudit services pose a threat to auditor independence. Furthermore, in terms of 
taxation, audit related nonaudit services have been revealed to affect auditor 
independence. However, nonrecurring nonaudit services have been proven not to 
affect audit profession as compared to recurring. Then recurring taxation services 
tend to jeopardize the auditors’ work. This information will help audit committee in 
establishing the policies and procedure in relation to nonaudit services. This is 
required under MCCG revised 2012, in which the audit committee needs to establish 
rules and procedure for the provision of nonaudit services. 
 
In addition, the study contributes to the literature on auditor independence proxies by 
quality financial reporting, corporate governance and most importantly to the 
nonaudit services which is still under debated. This study extends upon studies by 
Abdul Wahab et al. 2014 and Paterson and Valencia’s (2011) on recurring and 
nonrecurring nonaudit services and auditor independence proxies by accruals quality 
and interaction of corporate governance variables. The US findings and inferences 
may not hold to other developing countries such as Malaysia with different 
institutional settings, governance strategy, and the business environment. 
 
Another contribution can be seen in terms of the aspects of academic and knowledge 
by providing to a better understanding on the characteristics of nonaudit services in 
types, also recurring and nonrecurring for different types of nonaudit services that 
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could affect auditor independence. Past researchers have been unsuccessful in 
solving the underlying problem in relation to non- audit services and auditor 
independence since most of the studies concentrate on nonaudit services in 
homogenous nature and also without taking into consideration the corporate 
governance variables. This study aims to contribute to the literature on the effect of 
recurring and nonrecurring types of nonaudit services on auditor independence in the 
Malaysian audit market. 
 
The study also will shed light on the issues of corporate governance, especially audit 
committees in Malaysia. These include the monitoring mechanisms in corporate 
governance, and anecdotal claims that their roles are very much important in 
maintaining independence for auditor.  
1.6 Organization of the Remainder of the Chapters 
 
The study is organized into the following chapters: 
 
CHAPTER ONE: INTRODUCTION 
 
Chapter 1 provides the background of the study including the motivation, problem 
statement, research question, research objectives, and contribution of the study and 
organization of the remaining chapters. 
 
CHAPTER TWO: INSTITUTIONAL SETTING 
 
Chapter 2 is about an institutional setting. It contains an introduction of the chapter, 
development of Malaysian capital market, auditing background in Malaysia, 
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financial reporting and audit market in Malaysia, corporate governance, auditor 
independence: Current regulatory  on nonaudit services  in Malaysia, US, Australia 
and UK and the last is chapter summary. 
 
CHAPTER THREE: PRIOR RESEARCH 
 
Chapter 3 explores the prior studies on auditor independence, corporate governance 
and nonaudit services. It starts with the introduction, auditor independence focusing 
on the definition and threat to auditor independence such as audit lowballing, other 
threat to auditor independence, accruals quality proxies for auditor independence, 
nonaudit services relating to the measurement used, literature on nonaudit services 
and auditor independence, literature on corporate governance and it ends with the 
summary of the chapter and the development of the conceptual framework. 
CHAPTER FOUR: HYPOTHESIS DEVELOPMENT 
 
Chapter 4 induces the hypotheses from the literature that comprise of introduction, 
theories in the study, nonaudit services and auditor independence, corporate 
governance and auditor independence, the effect of corporate governance on the 
relationship between nonaudit services and auditor independence and the summary 
of the chapter. 
CHAPTER FIVE: RESEARCH METHODOLOGY 
 
Chapter 5 outlines the research methodology that deals with introduction, sample 
size and data collection, research design that explains the measurement for auditor 
independence, nonaudit services and corporate governance variables, empirical 
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model of the study, data analysis on descriptive, univariate, and multivariate analysis, 
and lastly  focusing on the sensitivity and robustness test of the  study. 
 
CHAPTER SIX: RESULTS AND DISCUSSIONS 
 
This chapter discusses on the result of the findings. It consists of introduction, 
descriptive statistics on the variable under study, results using univariate analysis, 
discussion of the result using multivariate analysis, sensitivity test, and lastly the 
discussion and conclusions. 
CHAPTER SEVEN: SUMMARY AND CONCLUSION 
 
This chapter highlights the summary and discussion. The chapter starts with 
introduction, summary of the research, limitation of the study and study contribution.  
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CHAPTER 2: INSTITUTIONAL SETTING  
2.1 Introduction 
 
This chapter present an overview of the institutional setting in Malaysian and other 
developed countries. Section 2.2 describes the development of Malaysian capital 
market. Section 2.3 focus on the financial reporting and audit market in Malaysia. 
Section 2.4 focuses on corporate governance globally. Section 2.5 elaborates on the 
corporate governance in Malaysia. Section 2.6 discusses on the current regulation of 
nonaudit services in Malaysia, United States (US), Australia, and the United 
Kingdom (UK). Lastly, section 2.7 provides a summary of the chapter. 
2.2 Development of Malaysian Capital Market 
 
In Malaysia, the development of capital market can be determined to be the late 
1980s. 1989 was a milestone in the development of Malaysia’s equity market starting 
with market delisting from the stock exchange. The boost of privatization projects 
and the equity boom in 1993, market capitalization exceeded that of Singapore by the 
mid-1990s, making the Malaysian market one of the fastest growing in the region. 
 
As Singapore was formerly part of Malaysia, companies in these two countries listed 
on both KLSE (now known as Bursa Malaysia) and the Stock Exchange of Singapore 
(SES) until the end of 1989. Since then, KLSE has made several attempts, including 
the foundational of computerized trading, a central depository, and well-organized 
clearing and settlement systems in order to safeguard market infrastructure. In 
addition, the governing framework has been reviewed to support initial public 
offering (IPOs) and equity investments by domestic and foreign investors. Due to 
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that some big privatized companies such as Telekom Malaysia Berhad and Tenaga 
Nasional Berhad were listed on Bursa Malaysia, crafting it one of the resourceful-
developing markets in the region in the mid-1990s (Shimomoto, 1999). 
 
Before the Asian financial crisis, there were a total of 621 firms listed on the Kuala 
Lumpur Stock Exchange which amounted to a total market capitalisation of RM806 
billion in 1996. The crisis hit Malaysia on 14 July 1997 when the country’s Bank 
Negara dismissed freezing the ringgit to the US dollar. In the middle of the year after 
the crisis, the ringgit declined 46.3% against the US dollar. In 1998, real GDP fell 
7.5% domestic demand drop about 25%, the Kuala Lumpur Stock Exchange fell 75% 
from its pre-crisis level 47.21% of 627 Malaysian companies were financially 
distressed, with interest coverage ratios less than 1.00 and the number of corporate 
bankruptcies increase about 250%. Inflation, however, was only a surprisingly 
modest of 5.3% in 1998 (Morris et al., 2011). 
 
The stock market had an essential place in the Malaysian economy at the beginning 
of the crisis. During the crisis, in 1997, 708 companies were listed on the Kuala 
Lumpur Stock Exchange’s main market with a total market capitalization of 
RM375,769 million. At that time, the KLSE’s market capitalization was 2.017 times 
GDP, a ratio second in Asia, while Malaysia categorized fourth among Asian 
countries in the number of listed companies per capita. Nevertheless, the role of the 
KLSE in financing firms was second by a large margin to that of debt markets and 
the banking sector. In 1997, nearly 58% of net funds raised came from the banking 
sector, while 11% were from the domestic debt market, 14% from the equity market, 
and 16% from foreign borrowings although Malaysian listed companies’ dependence 
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on debt finance was noticeably less than in the other Asian countries sternly affected 
by and lower the average leverage of 35 countries between 1988 and 1996 (Claessens 
et al., 2000). 
 
The KLSE listing rules (KLSE, 2001c, clause 3.05) required that 25% of a 
company’s issued shares be held by the public, up to 10% of which could be held by 
Bumiputera (mainly indigenous Malay) investors as part of the country’s National 
Development Policy. Tun Dr Mahathir (previous prime minister) took alternative 
steps to stabilize the economy such as cutting interest rates, raising foreign debt from 
neighbouring Asian countries, re-pegging the ringgit against the US dollar in 
September 1998, restricting the trading of Malaysian stocks outside Malaysia, 
introducing a punitive tax for holding Malaysian stocks less than one year and 
making unofficial trading of the ringgit illegal. It has been said that, by refusing IMF 
intervention and pursuing its own course, Malaysia suffered less and emerged earlier 
from the crisis than other Asian countries (Morris et al., 2011). 
 
After the financial crisis of 2008, the equity capital market in Malaysia has 
experienced intense development with a stable growth in the number of listed 
companies and the amount of funds acquired. After the financial crisis in 1999, the 
number of companies listed on the exchange increased to a total of 757 companies 
with market capitalisation amounted to RM552 billion. By the end of 2004, there 
were 963 companies with a total market capitalisation of RM722 billion. The equity 
market has increased the development of the private sector by allowing several 
companies to get low-cost financing through initial public offerings (IPOs) and 
issuances of new shares (Marzuki, 2014).  
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Currently Malaysia's capital market expanded by 10.5% to RM2.7 trillion in 2013, 
underpinned by steady growth in key. The bond market ended the year at RM1.0 
trillion and maintained its position as the third-largest in Asia relative to GDP. 
Equity market capitalization grew to RM1.7 trillion with the benchmark index rising 
10.5%, making the market one of the top performers in Asia. The domestic small-cap 
index documented a 36.7% increase, supported by growing participation by 
institutional funds and greater interest by retail investors. The capital market 
continued to be a main foundation of financing with RM94 bil rose through corporate 
bonds and initial public offerings (IPOs). The SC has pointed out the market's space 
and depth underpinned the strongest period of capital-raising activities on record as 
RM240bil was raised over the last two years markets (The Star, 2014).  
With the stable capital market in Malaysia, the increase in the companies listed on 
the main market, helps increase the number of populations in this study and thus will 
increase the generalization of the study.  
 
2.3 Financial Reporting and Audit Market in Malaysia 
 
According to Arens et al. (2011), the accounting and auditing system play an 
important role to ensure high confidence in chartered accountant firm and the audit 
process. The audit process provides the vital link to ensure credibility of financial 
statement prepared by management of companies to be used by its stakeholders for 
various purposes. Accounting concepts and principles are used by the accounting 
standard setting authority, the Malaysian Accounting Standard Board (MASB), for 
enhancing comparability and consistency of the financial statement. The Accounting 
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profession under the leadership of Malaysian Institute of Accountant (MIA) provides 
suitably trained, qualified accountant to ensure proper accounting and auditing 
system is of the highest quality in the corporate sector. 
 
Among the important key players, the accounting profession is responsible in 
ensuring proper accounting and auditing system. This body are being supported by 
other regulatory bodies such as Securities Commission, the Bank Negara, and the 
Companies Commission of Malaysia, together with the Accountant’s General Office 
and the Auditor’s General Office or Department, as well as corporate players, 
directors and management of the companies play a significant role in ensuring the 
sound system of financial reporting has been put in place to protect the public 
interest (refer to figure 2.1). 
 
There are various pieces of legislation and regulatory organization in financial 
reporting framework in Malaysia. The purpose of the framework is intended to 
provide an essential level of regulation on the financial reporting system and the 
auditing practice in Malaysia. The accounting regulatory framework in Malaysia 
comprised of Financial Reporting Act 1997 that established the Malaysian 
Accounting Standard Board (MASB) and Financial Reporting Foundation (FRF), 
Accountant Act 1967 that establish the Malaysian Institutes of Accountant (MIA), 
Securities Commission Act 1967 and Company Act 1965. Besides that, all public 
listed companies in Malaysia are required to adhere to Bursa Malaysia Listing 
Requirementss. 
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The Securities Commission was established under the authority of the Ministry of 
Finance and started its operations in 1993 under the Securities Commission Act 
1993. The Securities Commission (SC) licenses capital market players and oversees 
the activities of the several exchanges and institutions that comprise the KLSE. The 
establishment of the SC in 1993 was intended to streamline the regulatory framework 
of the Malaysian capital market that helps the efficiency, professionalism and orderly 
development of both the securities and futures industries to ensure protection of the 
interests of investors. The SC also attempts to ensure the proper conduct of market 
institutions and licensed persons. The SC has a very wide scope, encompassing all 
aspects of the securities industry, including advising the Minister of Finance on all 
matters relating to the securities and futures industries. Additionally, it is also the 
registering authority for the prospectuses of corporations. 
 
The Companies Act 1965 was based on the UK Companies Act 1948 and modelled 
on the Australian Uniform Companies Act 1961. Since independence in 1957, a 
number of amendments have taken place to suit the evolving Malaysian legal and 
corporate environment. The Companies Act 1965 requires that all the listed 
companies and those that wish to be listed on the Bursa Malaysia to prepare annual 
reports in accordance with the Ninth Schedule of the Act. The Ninth Schedule 
prescribes only minimal disclosure requirements for the profit and loss accounts, 
balance sheets and the director’s reports of companies in accordance with Section 
169 and 326 of the Companies Act 1965. Additionally, the Companies Act 1965 
requires that the published accounts present a true and fair view, although no 
statutory definition is accorded to this term. 
 
